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785 
THE WORLD OF THE DEAD, THE RIGHT OF SEPULCHER, 
AND 
THE POWER OF INFORMATION 
 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
Shipley v. City of New York1 
(decided June 10, 2015) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The common law right of sepulcher is an old rule that protects 
the next of kin’s right to find peace and comfort in the act of burying 
a loved one.2  The New York State legislature recognizes the im-
portance of protecting the next of kin’s right to interment and has 
codified this right in New York Public Health Law (“NYPHL”) arti-
cle 42.3  Therefore, a plaintiff may bring an action under the common 
law right of sepulcher and the applicable section of NYPHL article 
42 when an interference to the right of proper burial occurs.4  New 
York courts have broadly interpreted the issues surrounding the right 
to bury a loved one.5  This broad interpretation has permitted com-
pensation for the interference with the right to bury.6  However, there 
is a tendency to apply a narrow interpretation resulting in a deprecia-
 
1 37 N.E.3d 58 (N.Y. 2015). 
2 Melfi v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 877 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2009). 
3 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015) (citing to Patterson v. 
Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574 (“The decent burial of the dead is a matter in which the public has 
concern, and it is against the public health if it does not take place, at all, and against a prop-
er public sentiment, that it should not take place with decency.”)).  
4 See, e.g., Rugova v. City of N.Y., 16 N.Y.S.3d 233, 237 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015) 
(claiming a loss of sepulcher and violation of NYPHL § 4214). 
5 See, e.g., Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 473 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1896) (circumvent-
ing the argument that because there is “no such thing as a property value in human remains,” 
there is not a valid injury claim). 
6 See Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., 95 N.E. 695, 696 (N.Y. 1911) (holding that plaintiff 
can recover monetary loss for wounded feelings and mental distress). 
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tion of the common law right of sepulcher.7  Specifically, Shipley v. 
City of New York failed to uphold the next of kin’s right to proper 
burial when it narrowly interpreted both the common law right of 
sepulcher and NYPHL § 4215.8 
This Note argues that New York courts must apply a broad in-
terpretation of both the common law and statute to protect the survi-
vor’s right to interment.  It also proposes that a notification require-
ment is essential to the continued protection of the next of kin’s right 
of sepulcher.  In Section II, this Note analyzes the issue presented in 
Shipley.  Section III explores the relationship between the common 
law and the statute.  Finally, Section IV discusses the impact a nar-
row interpretation has on the right of sepulcher, and why the legisla-
ture should amend the statute to include a notification requirement. 
II. SHIPLEY V. CITY OF NEW YORK 
A. Factual and Procedural History 
Jesse Shipley, a high school student, died in an auto accident.9  
Shortly after his death, his parents (the “Shipleys”) agreed to the per-
formance of an autopsy but cautioned the Medical Examiner 
(“M.E.”) to maintain the body in a condition “as presentable as pos-
sible” for burial purposes.10  At the conclusion of the autopsy, the 
M.E. placed the brain in a jar, labeled it with Jesse’s name and the 
date of the accident, and placed the jar on a shelf.11  It was standard 
procedure for the M.E. to withhold the organ so that a 
neuropathologist, who came to the office when at least six specimens 
were available, could examine it.12  The Shipleys became aware that 
the M.E. retained their son’s brain when students visited the New 
York Office of Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”).13  However, the 
Shipleys’ priest informed them that without the organ, the funeral 
 
7 See, e.g., Harris-Cunningham v. Med. Exam’r of N.Y. County, 690 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999) (holding that the written consent requirement did not apply to the 
medical examiner). 
8 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 66. 
9 Id. at 59. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 59-60. 
12 Id. at 60. 
13 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 60. 
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was performed improperly.14  As a result, a second funeral was held 
months after the first funeral.15 
The Shipleys commenced an action in New York Supreme 
Court against the City of New York and the OCME claiming negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress resulting from the display and al-
leged mishandling of the brain, and unlawful interference with “the 
Shipleys’ right to decedent’s whole body.”16  The defendants argued 
that the Shipleys failed to state a claim because the M.E. had the 
authority to perform the autopsy, and the law authorized the removal 
and retention of the organ.17  The New York Supreme Court denied 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the defendants 
appealed to the Appellate Division for the Second Department.18 
The Appellate Division held that the M.E. had statutory au-
thority to use its discretion in conducting an autopsy and retaining 
organs for further examination.19  However, the power to retain the 
organs was extinguished at the completion of a legitimate purpose.20  
The Appellate Division further held that the M.E. had a mandated 
obligation under both NYPHL § 4215(1) and the common law right 
of sepulcher “to turn over the decedent’s remains to the next of kin 
for preservation and proper burial.”21  Furthermore, the court viewed 
this obligation to be ministerial in nature, which was for the benefit 
of and owed to the next of kin.22  Informing the next of kin that alt-
hough the body was ready for burial, the M.E. would retain particular 
organs for further examination could have satisfied this obligation.23  
The notice would allow for a proper burial because the next of kin, 
who knew what is needed for their ritual to be complete, could make 
an informed decision to either bury the body without the organs or 
wait for the completion of the necessary examination and then bury 
the body with the organs.24  Thus, the case went to trial on the issue 
 
14 Id. at 69 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 60 (majority opinion). 
17 Id. at 60. 
18 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 60. 
19 Id. at 61. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id.; see also Lauer v. City of N.Y., 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that a gov-
ernmental discretionary act renders a city immune to liability while a ministerial act does 
not). 
23 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 61. 
24 Id. 
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of whether the M.E. had failed to notify the Shipleys of the retention 
of their son’s brain.25  The jury entered a verdict in favor of the 
Shipleys for $1 million.26  The defendants subsequently appealed to 
the Appellate Division for the Second Department where no relief 
was found, and finally to the Court of Appeals of New York.27 
B. The Court’s Reasoning 
The Court of Appeals of New York rejected the Appellate Di-
vision’s decision in favor of the Shipleys, and held that mandating a 
notification requirement “was [an] error that broadly expanded the 
M.E.’s obligations under common law and statute.”28  In coming to 
this conclusion, the court analyzed the common law right of 
sepulcher and NYPHL article 42.29  First, in analyzing the common 
law right of sepulcher, the court interpreted the phrase “affords the 
next of kin the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for burial 
purpose” to mean an immediate possession of the body with or with-
out internal organs or tissue samples.30  The court reasoned that the 
purpose of the right was to afford the next of kin solace and comfort 
through the ritual of burying the decedent’s body.31  Therefore, the 
return of the body, regardless of the presence of the internal organs, 
achieved that goal.32 
Next, the Court of Appeals scrutinized NYPHL article 42 and 
held that there was no ministerial duty to return any organs or tissue 
samples or to notify the next of kin.33  The court reasoned that the 
M.E. had a “fairly broad” statutory authority to conduct autopsies un-
der NYPHL article 42, and, therefore, their acts were discretionary, 
not ministerial.34 
 
25 Id. at 61. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 62. 
28 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 64; see Shipley v. City of N.Y., 908 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 2d 
Dep’t 2010) (referencing Appellate Division’s decision affirming the denial of defendant’s 
motion of summary judgment and imposing a notification requirement). 
29 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 63. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 63. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 66. 
34 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 62; see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4209 (McKinney 1983) 
(providing a list of professionals who are authorized to perform an autopsy); N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 4210 (McKinney 2014) (conferring authority on a licensed medical physi-
4
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The court also found that the legislature did not intend to in-
clude the terms “organs or tissue samples” within the meaning of 
“remains of the body.”35  The court reasoned that had the legislature 
intended to include organs or tissue samples, it would have included 
the terms “any tissue, organs, or part thereof.”36  For instance, other 
sections of NYPHL article 42 and NYPHL § 1389 contain the lan-
guage “any tissue, organs or part thereof.”37  Moreover, the court read 
§ 4200(1)38 and § 4215(1)39 in tandem and determined that there was 
no language in the statute, expressed or implied, that would require 
the M.E. to return any organs or tissue samples retained after a lawful 
autopsy.40  Therefore, since the M.E. is a public employee performing 
a governmental function, the decision to conduct the autopsy and 
retain the organ was a discretionary act.41  As a result of this discre-
tionary act, the city was not subject to liability.42 
Finally, the court declined to impose a notification require-
ment because of practical and policy considerations.43  Specifically, 
the court was concerned that the provision did not address when or 
under what circumstances the M.E. should send the notification.44  
 
cian); see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4210 (McKinney 2015) (limiting the power to dis-
sect or conduct autopsy). 
35 Shipley, 37 N.E. at 64. 
36 Id. at 65; for further discussion of this issue, see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4216 
(McKinney 2015), N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4217 (McKinney 2015), and N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 4218 (McKinney 2015), which applies a criminal penalty for “body stealing, 
receiving a stolen dead human being, and opening graves” respectively. 
37 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 65. 
38 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4200 (McKinney 2015) (“Except in the cases in which a right 
to dissect it is expressly conferred by law, every body of a deceased person, within this state, 
shall be decently buried or incinerated within a reasonable time after death.”). 
39 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4215 (1) (McKinney 2015). 
In all cases in which a dissection has been made, the provisions of this 
article, requiring the burial or other lawful disposition of a body of a de-
ceased person, and the provisions of law providing for the punishment of 
interference with or injuries to it, apply equally to the remains of the 
body after dissection as soon as the lawful purposes of such dissection 
have been accomplished. 
     Id. 
40 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 66. 
41 Id. at 66. 
42 Id. at 62 (quoting Valdez v. City of N.Y., 960 N.E.2d 356 (N.Y. 2012) “[M.E.’s] con-
duct involved the ‘exercise of reasoned judgment’ that ‘may not result in the [City's] liability 
even [if] the conduct [was] negligent.’”). 
43 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 66. 
44 Id. at 67. 
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Also, the Appellate Division presumed that all of the next of kin 
wanted notice, and this assumption would lead to an influx of liti-
gants claiming “that they possessed a property interest in their dece-
dent’s organs.”45 
C. A Strong Dissent 
Judge Jenny Rivera authored a dissent admonishing the 
majority for failing to uphold the next of kin’s right of sepulcher 
under the common law and statute.46  In so doing, the dissent empha-
sized that the purpose of the common law right of sepulcher is to de-
fend the next of kin’s right to a proper burial.47  In addition, the dis-
sent noted that the plain language of NYPHL sections 4200 and 4215 
protects the right of interment.48  Finally, the dissent argued that un-
der NYPHL article 42, the M.E.’s authority to conduct an autopsy 
and retain the remains of the body is limited.49  Therefore, the M.E. 
has a ministerial duty based on the limitation, and thus the OCME 
was subject to liability.50 
Specifically, the dissent argued that the common law right of 
sepulcher, NYPHL sections 4200 and 4215, and New York City’s 
Health Code imposed a ministerial duty.51  Arguably, once the M.E. 
fulfilled the lawful purpose of possessing the body, performing an 
autopsy, and retaining any parts of the body, a ministerial duty arose 
that obligated the “proper return of all body parts for burial purpos-
es.”52  Moreover, the ministerial duty indicated legislative’s intent to 
protect the corporal remains of the deceased and the feelings of fami-
ly members.53 
 
45 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 67 (citing Waeschle v. Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 
2009)). 
46 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 74 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. at 69. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 70; but see Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 62 (majority opinion) (holding that the M.E.’s 
authority is fairly broad). 
50 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 74 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 70-71; (citing N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 557(f)(1) (2015). Conducting an autopsy 
may be done if a person died from a criminal act or the deceased died suddenly but the cause 
of death was not apparent. Id. However, an autopsy will not be conducted if “it may be con-
cluded with reasonable certainty that death occurred from natural causes or obvious traumat-
ic injury, and there are no other circumstances which would appear to require an autopsy un-
less the medical examiner deems the autopsy necessary in accordance with the law.”) Id. 
52 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 75 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 74. 
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Furthermore, the dissent adopted a broad interpretation of the 
common law right of sepulcher and NYPHL article 42 to determine 
the legislature’s intent.54  First, the dissent focused on the only provi-
sion under NYPHL article 42 that deals with “the retention of organs 
upon completion of an autopsy.”55  NYPHL § 4215(2) states in rele-
vant part “that the persons having possession of the [unclaimed] body 
may, in their discretion, cause it to be either buried or cremated or 
may retain parts of such body for scientific purposes.”56  The dissent 
reasoned that “parts of such body” is a subsection of “remains of the 
body” because the individual may retain “‘parts’ rather than the 
whole of the body, upon completion of the autopsy.”57  Hence, in 
NYPHL § 4215(1), “remains of the body” means that organs are in-
cluded with the cadaver “because the reference to ‘parts of such 
body’ in NYPHL § 4215(2) would be unnecessary.”58 
Second, the limitation in NYPHL § 4215(2) allowing for the 
retention of “parts of such body” exclusively for scientific purposes 
supported the proposition that remains of the body includes organs 
because “organs are commonly used for scientific study.”59  Addi-
tionally, the interpretation that “remains of the body” contained 
organs within its meaning applied to the entire section 4215 because 
“the meaning of a single section may not be determined by splitting it 
up into several parts.”60  Furthermore, NYPHL article 43, dealing 
with anatomical gifts, included organs within its meaning of “parts of 
the body.”61 
 
54 Id. at 69–72. 
55 Id. at 72. 
56 Id. 
57 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 69-72 (Rivera, J., dissenting): 
In all cases in which an autopsy or dissection has been made of an 
unclaimed body, the provisions of this article requiring the burial or 
other lawful disposition of the body of a deceased person and punishing, 
interference with or injuries to it, shall apply equally to the remains of 
such body as soon as the lawful purposes of such autopsy or dissection 
have been accomplished, except that the persons having possession of 
the body may, in their discretion, cause it to be either buried or cremated, 
or may retain parts of such body for scientific purposes. 
      N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4215(2) (McKinney 2015). 
58 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 73. 
59 Id. at 72. 
60 Id. (citing N.Y. CONS. LAWS BOOK 1, STATUTES § 97, COMMENT (McKinney 2015)). 
61 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d. at 73 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4300 (5) (McKinney 2015) “ 
‘Part’ of a body includes organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood, other fluids and other 
portions of a human body, and ‘part’ includes ‘parts.’ ”). 
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Lastly, the dissent agreed with the Appellate Division that a 
notification requirement should be imposed on the M.E.62  The dis-
sent reasoned that a notification requirement would ensure the next of 
kin are aware of the condition of the body before preparing for buri-
al.63  Without the information, the next of kin would be unable to 
exercise their right of sepulcher.64 
III. THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF SEPULCHER AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO NYPHL ARTICLE 42 
The right of sepulcher is an important common law right.65  
Burial rituals have been performed for centuries and throughout the 
world.66  People have a natural desire to bury their dead, and these 
rituals allow family members to find comfort.67 New York State has 
an abundance of religions that practice different burial rituals and the 
common law right of sepulcher seeks to prevent interference with 
these rituals.68  Specifically, the common law is the next of kin’s 
absolute right “to the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for 
preservation and burial.”69  If a “person unlawfully interferes with 
that right or improperly deals with the decedent’s body,” damages are 
awarded against that person “as compensation to the next of kin” for 
the emotional injury that resulted from their inability to conduct a 
proper burial.70 
 
62 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 76. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Bambrick v. Booth Mem. Med. Ctr., 593 N.Y.S.2d 252, 254 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1993). 
66 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 304; see Elizabeth C. Burton, M.E., Religions and the Autopsy, 
MEDSCAPE (Mar. 21, 2012), http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/1705993-overview (il-
lustrating that the ancient Egyptians would mummify their deceased by embalming the body 
and enshrouding it in strips of linen); see also Mummification, THE BRITISH MUSEUM, 
http://www.ancientegypt.co.uk/mummies/home.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (showing 
that the Roman Empire imposed a religious duty upon the surviving kin to perform religious 
ceremonies before the actual burial). 
67 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 304. 
68 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Burton, M.E., Religions and the Autopsy, MEDSCAPE, Mar. 21, 
2012, http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/1705993-overview (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) 
(illustrating different practices in Judaism, Hinduism, and Christianity); See also Melfi, 877 
N.Y.S.2d at 304 (citing to various religions and cultures practicing burial rituals). 
69 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 240. 
70 Id. See Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 306 (defining the term “right of sepulcher” to mean the 
right to bury a body in a tomb or monument, as opposed to “the right of sepulture” which is 
the right of interment. The terms have been fused together through the years and today the 
right of sepulcher encompasses both meanings); sepulcher is pronounced [sep-uh l ker]. 
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New York State has codified the common law right of sepul-
cher in NYPHL § 4200.71  The statute protects the next of kin’s right 
to perform a proper burial while ensuring the public’s health and 
concerns.72  Furthermore, NYPHL article 4200 “does not circumvent 
or abrogate any rights or causes of action which have existed under 
the common law for hundreds of years.”73  Therefore, the purpose of 
the statute is to protect the right to bury a loved one under a particular 
religious belief.74  Lastly, NYPHL § 4210(c) provides a religious 
exemption, which is indicative of the protection afforded to survi-
vors. 75 
A. The Creation of the Right of Sepulcher: A Broad 
Interpretation 
Larson v. Chase76 is the first court in the United States to hold 
that interference with the common law right of sepulcher will entitle 
the next of kin to compensation for mental suffering and injury to his 
or her feelings if the injury is the natural and proximate cause of the 
wrongful act.77  A widow brought an action against the defendant for 
the unlawful dissection of her husband’s body that caused her mental 
suffering and nervous shock.78 
The defendant argued that the widow could not maintain a 
cause of action because the widow did not have a “legal interest in or 
right to the body,” and the widow could not sustain a claim since a 
“body is not property.”79  The defendant also argued that a claim for 
“mental anguish and injury to the feelings” is only actionable if it is 
 
71 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015) (citing Patterson v. Pat-
terson, 1875 WL 10590 (1875); citing In re Kraemer’s Estate, 46 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sur. Ct. 
Bronx Cty. 1944), which states that the burial of a deceased is “not only a common law duty 
in the interest of public health and decency but it has been made a statutory duty which may 
devolve even upon strangers; citing Correa v. Maimonides, 629 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. 
Kings Cty. 1995)). 
72  N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4210(C) (McKinney 2015); see www.nyc.gov. stating in their 
website that if a family raises a realistic religious objection based on “Judaism, Islam, Chris-
tian Science, Jehovah’s Witness, or 7th Day Adventist,” the family is allowed an opportunity 
to object). 
76 50 N.W. 238 (Minn. 1891). 
77 Id. at 239. 
78 Id. at 238. 
79 Id. 
9
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accompanied by an actual physical “injury to person or property.”80  
However, the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected defendant’s ar-
guments and reasoned that the widow had a legal right to the posses-
sion of her husband’s body because she was “intimately and closely 
connected with the deceased by domestic ties and that this was a right 
which the law will recognize and protect.”81 
Moreover, the court analyzed “the doctrine that a corpse is not 
property,” to justify its decision.82  In a limited discussion of the his-
tory of the disposition and burial of the body after death, the court 
explained that the notion that a dead body had no property value was 
the rule of the land under ecclesiastical law.83  In England, churches 
had the authority to take possession of a dead body for burial purpos-
es, and the church enforced the rules of sepulcher.84  As a result, the 
next of kin did not have “a property interest in the body or ashes of 
an ancestor, and thus no legal remedy.”85  This view changed when 
ecclesiastical law was no longer the rule during colonial times, and 
courts conferred the duty of timely and decently burying a corpse on 
the next of kin.86  However, the issue of whether the next of kin could 
recover for a violation of the right of sepulcher when a corpse did not 
have a property value remained.87  Courts tried to sidestep this issue 
by allowing recovery of mental anguish when the tort of trespass was 
present.88 
The court in Larson creatively cured this matter when it im-
posed a property value in the exclusive right to the possession of a 
decedent’s body for burial.89  The court reasoned that the property 
value in the exclusive right led to the conclusion that the body “is his 
property in the broadest and most general sense of the term.”90  The 
right allowed the widow to recover for her injuries solely for mental 
 
80 Id. 
81 Larson, 50 N.W. at 239. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 238. 
84 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 306. 
85 Patrick J. Mulqueen, “Only Dust Remains[?]”: The 9/11 Memorial Litigation And the 
Reach of Quasi-Property Rights, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 254 (2012). 
86 Id. at 254. 
87 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 307. 
88 Id. See also Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 (1868) (claiming mental anguish for dis-
turbing and removing the body of an infant buried in a cemetery under an action for tres-
pass). 
89 Larson, 50 N.W. at 239. 
90 Id. at 239. 
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss4/7
2016 THE WORLD OF THE DEAD 795 
suffering and nervous shock without proving pecuniary damages.91  
In New York, Larson became a seminal case, and many New York 
courts have cited to the opinion.92 
Subsequently, in Foley v. Phelps,93 the New York Appellate 
Division for the First Department held that a widow had a legal right 
to the possession of her husband’s body “in the same condition it was 
in when death supervened.”94 The deceased was a man who died at a 
hospital after falling into an elevator shaft.95  The widow “begged and 
implored” the hospital not to perform an autopsy, but it was 
nevertheless done.96 
The issue was whether the widow could maintain an action 
when there was no property value in human remains.97  The First De-
partment relied on Larson and reasoned that there was a quasi-
property value in human remains.98  That value was found in the duty 
to protect the decedent’s body from violation and was “imposed by 
the universal feelings of mankind.”99  However, the court did not base 
its holding on a quasi-property principle.100  Rather, the court relied 
on the widow’s legal right to possess the decedent’s body for purpos-
es of burying the “corpse, and to preserve its remains.”101  Finally, the 
court required the return of the decedent’s body in the same condition 
that it was in at the time death occurred, and “not merely to such a 
hacked, hewed, and mutilated corpse as some stranger .”102  The court 
 
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 306 (citing to Larson); see Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 472 
(citing to Larson); see Darcy, 95 N.E. at 696 (citing to Larson); see Mulqueen, supra note 87 
(“the seminal case of Larson v. Chase delineated the quasi-property right quite broadly.”). 
93 37 N.Y.S 471 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1896). Prior to Foley, and while N.Y. courts cited to 
Larson, the issue of whether the next of kin could recover for a violation of the right of sep-
ulcher when a corpse did not have a property value remained.  Courts tried to sidestep this 
issue by allowing recovery for mental anguish when the tort of trespass was present. Melfi, 
877 N.Y.S.2d at 307. See also Driscoll, 99 Mass. at 284 (allowing compensation for mental 
anguish resulting from the disturbance and removal of an infant deceased body in an action 
for trespass). 
94 Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 474. 
95 Id. at 471. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 473. 
98 Id. 
99 Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 473 (citing to Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 
227 (1872)).  
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 474. 
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declined to determine the measure of damages.103 
In Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp.,104 the New York Court of 
Appeals decided the issue of damages and held that the surviving 
next of kin “is entitled to maintain the action and to recover damages 
for her wounded feelings and mental distress.”105  The plaintiff’s son 
died while under the care of the defendant.106  The mother asked for 
her son’s remains, but the hospital refused to deliver the body to a 
funeral director, and instead performed an autopsy.107  The mother 
claimed that the defendant interfered with her right to possess the 
body when the autopsy was done and caused her wounded feelings 
and mental anguish.108  The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.109 
The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that a cause of ac-
tion did exist because the right to the possession of the body for buri-
al purposes is a right that the law recognizes and protects.110  Moreo-
ver, the law awards damages to the wounded feelings of the claimant 
even in the absence of pecuniary damages to protect this right.111 
New York courts continued their broad interpretation in Has-
sard v. Lehane.112  The Appellate Division for the First Department 
held that an M.E. was not justified in keeping body parts after an 
authorized autopsy in the absence of further direction of a coroner or 
district attorney.113  A twenty-eight-year-old man was injured while 
driving home from a funeral.114  The man was taken to the hospital 
where he later died.115  The hospital’s representatives did not ask the 
mother for permission to conduct an autopsy.116  They subsequently 
dissected his body, removed his spleen, cut it into little pieces, and 
preserved it in a jar of alcohol.117  Although the deceased did not die 
 
103 Id. 
104 95 N.E. 695 (N.Y. 1911). 




109 Darcy, 95 N.E. at 696. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 696. 
112 128 N.Y.S. 161, 164 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1911). 
113 Id. at 164. 
114 Id. at 162. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Hassard, 128 N.Y.S. at 162. 
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in a suspicious way, the M.E. argued his acts were justified.118  
However, the court found that viewing the body without an autopsy 
would have sufficed in determining the cause of death.119 
The court reasoned that New York Code § 310 did not confer 
authority to retain such body parts.120  The statute states in relevant 
part that, “[w]here a dissection has been made, requiring the burial of 
a dead body[,] . . . [the provisions of this article] apply equally to the 
remains of the body dissected, as soon as the lawful purposes of such 
dissection have been accomplished.”121 This section is the equivalent 
of the present statute, NYPHL § 4215 and uses the language “apply 
equally to the remains of the body.”122 
Finally, in Melfi v. Mount Sinai Hospital,123 the Appellate Di-
vision for the First Department held that a loss of sepulcher claim ac-
crues when the next of kin becomes aware of the act that caused the 
interference to the right of sepulcher.124  The defendant never notified 
the next of kin that the deceased, a famous playwright, had died.125 
Instead, the hospital sent the body to a community college for 
embalming practices and then buried the decedent in “Potter’s Field,” 
a mass grave site.126  The Melfis learned of the death two months lat-
er when a hotel manager called Mr. Melfi’s niece.127  The Melfis en-
listed the help of local media to locate the final resting place of Mr. 
Melfi.128 
 
118 Id. at 163. 
119 Id. at 164. 
120 Id. at 163. 
121 Id. (pertaining to the Penal Code § 310, all situations “where a dissection has been 
made, requiring the burial of a dead body, and other provisions of the Penal Code punishing 
interference with and injuries to it, apply equally to the remains of the body dissected, as 
soon as the lawful purposes of such dissection have been accomplished.”). 
122 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4215 (McKinney 2015). 
In all cases in which a dissection has been made, the provisions of this 
article, requiring the burial or other lawful disposition of a body of a de-
ceased person, and the provisions of law providing for the punishment of 
interference with or injuries to it, apply equally to the remains of the 
body after dissection as soon as the lawful purposes of such dissection 
have been accomplished. 
Id. 
123 877 N.Y.S.2d 300 (2009). 
124 Id. at 309. 
125 Id. at 302. 
126 Id. (obtaining fame through works such as “Birdbath” and “Oh! Calcutta!”). 
127 Id. at 303. 
128 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 303. 
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In 2002, the decedent’s brother filed a notice of claim stating 
that Mr. Melfi died in 2001, and the hospital failed to notify the fami-
ly of the death.129  The defendant moved for dismissal of the 
complaint arguing that under the requirement for service of claim, the 
family failed to file within 90-days.130  The court rejected defendant’s 
argument and reasoned that although the violation that caused the in-
terference occurred in 2001, the plaintiff’s emotional injury did not 
occur until the knowledge of its existence surfaced in 2002.131  There-
fore, “the 90-day clock” started to run in 2002 when the family be-
came aware that Mr. Melfi’s body had been mutilated and buried in 
Potter’s field.132 
B. An Emerging Trend: A Narrow Interpretation 
New York courts have begun to narrowly interpret both the 
common law and the statutory right of sepulcher.133  Consequently, 
this shift from broadly interpreting the right to narrowly interpreting 
it has weakened the common law right of sepulcher.134  This weaken-
ing of the right is evident when courts decide on similar issues but 
come to different conclusions based on their interpretation.135 
For instance, the Appellate Division for the Second Depart-
ment in Bambrick v. Booth Mem. Med. Ctr.136 broadly interpreted 
NYPHL § 4214 to allow for family members to recover for the per-
formance of an unauthorized autopsy.137  Under § 4214, a hospital is 
required to receive written consent before administering an autop-
sy.138  After the plaintiff sought damages for the performance of an 
unauthorized autopsy, the hospital argued that the failure to secure a 
written consent was not “dispositive of the liability issue.”139  




131 Id. at 309. 
132 Id. at 310. 
133 See infra notes 144, 151. 
134 See, e.g., Juseinoski v. N.Y Hosp., 795 N.Y.S.2d 753 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005) 
(denying recovery to Muslim plaintiffs because the hospital did not conduct the autopsy). 
135 See infra note 145. 
136 593 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1993). 
137 Id. at 255. 
138 Id. at 254. 
139 Id. at 254. 
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the lack of a written consent did warrant the imposition of liability.140  
Further, the court reasoned that the purpose of the written require-
ment “was designed to afford relatives greater control over the dispo-
sition of the remains of their decedents.”141  Moreover, such “intent is 
clearly consistent with the body of statutory and decisional law which 
places great emphasis on the rights of family members to receive the 
bodies of their loved ones in as undisturbed a condition as possi-
ble.”142  Therefore, the court’s broad interpretation of the common 
law right of sepulcher allowed the family members to recover.143 
In contrast, nearly six years after Bambrick, the First Depart-
ment in Harris-Cunningham v. Medical Examiner of New York 
County144 shifted to narrowly interpreting § 4214 to bar a widow 
from recovering for interfering with her right to properly bury her de-
cedent husband.145  The widow claimed she suffered an emotional in-
jury when the M.E. conducted an autopsy without consent and 
against her religious belief.146  However, the court held that under 
NYPHL § 4214, “the hospital’s affirmative duty to seek written con-
sent did not extend to the M.E.”147  Furthermore, under NYPHL § 
4210(c), the M.E. was not obligated to seek consent.148  Therefore, 
the court’s narrow interpretation barred the widow from recovering 
monetary damages for her decedent husband’s unconsented autop-
sy.149 
Most recently the First Department broadly interpreted the 
common law but narrowly interpreted the statutory right to hold that 
the defendants were not liable for interfering with the right to a prop-
er burial.150  In Rugova v. City of New York,151 the issue was whether 
the failure to notify the family of the death of their son resulted in a 
violation of the common law and statute.152  The son died in a car ac-
 
140 Id. 
141 Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 254. 
144 690 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999). 




149 Harris-Cunningham, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 245. 
150 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 238, 240. 
151 16 N.Y.S.3d 233 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015). 
152 Id. at 235. 
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cident, and his identity was immediately ascertained.153  However, the 
police failed to notify the decedent’s family resulting in the inability 
of the family to object to an autopsy based on their religious belief.154  
Unfortunately, the family became aware of his death after reading a 
newspaper article, and an autopsy was conducted contrary to dece-
dent’s religious views.155 
The court held that, under the common law, the defendants 
were liable for interfering with the plaintiffs’ right to a proper burial 
because the defendants’ untimely notice resulted in the plaintiffs’ 
emotional distress.156  However, under the statute the defendants were 
not liable for their negligent act.157  Because NYPHL § 4210 (c) is the 
religious exemption rule, it limits the authority to perform autopsies 
and establishes the purpose of protecting the decedent’s remains and 
survivors’ feelings.158  The plaintiffs argued that in the absence of a 
compelling public necessity, the M.E. was required to seek consent 
before conducting the autopsy.159 However, the court reasoned that 
under NYPHL article 4210(c), the M.E. was not obligated “to wait 
and see if an objection would be made before performing the autop-
sy.”160  Therefore, the court interpreted the same issue differently un-
der the common law and the statutory right of sepulcher, which led to 
two different results.161 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The court in Shipley erred in applying a narrow interpretation 
and failed to see the importance of a notification requirement.162  
Case law suggests that New York courts must broadly interpret the 
right of sepulcher.163  The right to interment is a natural act that peo-
ple of all backgrounds find sacred.164  New York courts have long 
 
153 Id. at 238. 
154 Id. at 235. 
155 Id. at 236–38. 
156 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 240. 
157 Id. at 238. 
158 Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
159 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 238. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 235. 
162 See supra Section II.B. 
163 See supra Section III. A.; MULQUEEN, supra note 85. 
164 Melfi, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 304. 
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recognized the importance of this right and thus have protected it by 
any means necessary.165  The New York State legislature understood 
the significance of the common law right of sepulcher and codified it 
in NYPHL article 42 to reflect the public’s interest in the decent buri-
al of unknown decedents.166 
Unfortunately, there has been a trend to narrowly interpret the 
right of sepulcher based on the failure of understanding its signifi-
cance.167  For instance, in Harris-Cunningham, the First Depart-
ment’s omission of Bambrick’s reasoning caused a flawed holding.168  
Bambrick explained that under the common law and statute, the con-
trol of disposition belongs to the surviving family.169  Therefore, the 
written consent requirement was central to the issue of liability be-
cause it maintained the control in the next of kin.170  However, the 
court in Harris-Cunningham misunderstood the purpose of the writ-
ten consent requirement when it neglected to extend the meaning of 
hospitals to include an M.E.171  Similar to hospitals, the M.E. is au-
thorized to perform autopsies.172  Hence, an M.E. should also be re-
quired to receive a written consent before a dissection.173  Lastly, 
Harris-Cunningham misplaced the control of disposition in the M.E., 
contrary to the common law and statutory purpose.174 
There is also a trend to allow recovery under the common law 
but to deny it under the statute.175  However, the common law and the 
statutory right of sepulcher go hand in hand.176  NYPHL article 42 
does not revoke the age old law of sepulcher; rather, it upholds it.177  
For example, in Rugova, the plaintiff recovered for emotional distress 
because defendant’s untimely notice resulted in an interference with 
the immediate possession of the body and burial.178  However, under 
 
165 MULQUEEN, supra note 85. 
166 See supra Section III. 
167 See, e.g., Juseinoski, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 756 (denying recovery to Muslim plaintiffs be-
cause the hospital did not conduct the autopsy). 
168 Harris-Cunningham, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
169 Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
170 Id. 
171 Harris-Cuningham, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
172 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4209 (McKinney 2015). 
173 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015). 
174 Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
175 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 235. 
176 See supra note 71. 
177 See supra note 71. 
178 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 240. 
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NYPHL § 4210(c), the defendant was not liable for its negligent 
act.179 
The plaintiff’s argument that in the absence of a compelling 
public necessity, the M.E. was required to seek consent before 
conducting the autopsy made sense because if there is no urgent need 
to perform the autopsy, i.e., a compelling public necessity, the M.E. 
should not arbitrarily take away the next of kin’s right to object. 180  
Furthermore, the court distorted the meaning of NYPHL § 4210(c) 
when it held that first there must be an objection to an autopsy before 
a compelling public necessity is required.181  Alarmingly, the court 
acknowledged that the lack of notice was the obvious reason for the 
inability to raise an objection.182  Yet, the court refused to interpret 
the statute broadly to allow recovery.183  This narrow interpretation 
robbed the survivor’s right to object and unreasonably contradicted 
the purpose of the common law and statutory right of sepulcher.184 
Shipley continued this trend by failing to see the importance 
of the next of kin’s right of sepulcher.185  First, when a statutory 
scheme that protects a certain class does not provide for civil liability, 
a court may impose liability to further the statutory purpose––
something that the court in Shipley failed to do.186  Although it is 
clear that the common law and the statute sought to protect the 
surviving family members’ right to the immediate possession of the 
body for burial purposes, the statute failed to provide civil liability 
for the unconsented retention of organs in violation of the common 
law.187  Therefore, because organs and tissue samples are sometimes 
needed to perform a proper burial and the retention of such body 
parts interferes with the right of proper burial, the court in Shipley 
should have imposed civil liability on the defendants for interfering 
with the Shipleys’ right of sepulcher. 188 
Second, the court’s extensive statutory analysis failed to 
correctly ascertain legislative intent, which resulted in a flawed 
 
179 Id. at 238. 
180 Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 238; Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S. at 254. 




185 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 72 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
186 Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
187 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 2015). 
188 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 69 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
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decision.189  The intent of the New York State legislature was to 
protect the next of kin’s right to properly bury their deceased.190  
Legislative intent is notable in the codification of the common law 
right of sepulcher and in the limitation of authority in conducting 
dissections.191  The legislature intended to include organs and tissue 
samples within the meaning of NYPHL § 4215.192  Including organs 
and tissue samples would preserve the integrity of the decedent’s 
body, ensure the return of a loved one’s body in as “undisturbed a 
condition as possible,” and enable proper burial.193 
Lastly, the court’s reasoning that the M.E. had extensive 
authority in conducting autopsies is flawed because, although the 
M.E. has broad discretion in performing dissections, the statute 
tempers that discretion with guidelines.194 Regrettably, the holding in 
Shipley has placed the decision of disposition on the M.E. resulting in 
a violation of the right of sepulcher.195  Nevertheless, a notification 
concerning the condition of the body would help cushion the impact 
of this decision.196  The notice would empower survivors to make 
informed decisions.197 
Although the court in Shipley cited to policy and practical 
concerns for rejecting a notification requirement, the New York State 
legislature should amend NYPHL article 42 to include it.198  A notice 
requirement will prevent a violation of the next of kin’s right of 
sepulcher.199  For instance, under NYPHL § 4210(c), a notice of an 
impending autopsy safeguards the right to object based on a religious 
reason.200  Likewise, under NYPHL § 4214, the OCME, not just 
 
189 See supra Section II.B. 
190 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 70 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
191 See Bambrick, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 254 (holding that the legislative intent is clear in the 
limitation to perform autopsies); see Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 70 (Rivera, J., dissenting) (reason-
ing that limitations in the statute “evinces an intention to ensure proper return of all body 
parts for burial purposes”); see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW COMMENT ON § 4200 (McKinney 
2015) (commenting that the legislature intended to protect next of kin). 
192 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 70 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
193 See Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 474; see also Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 72 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
194 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 62 (majority opinion); see Bambrick, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 254 (hold-
ing that NYPHL article 42 limits the performance of autopsies). 
195 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 77 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
196 Id. at 61, 77. 
197 Id. at 77. 
198 Id. at 61, 77. 
199 Id. at 77. 
200 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 77. 
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hospitals, would have to notify the next of kin of the impending 
dissection, which would allow the survivor to consent.201  Also, under 
NYPHL § 4215 a decedent’s body would not be released without first 
informing the survivor as to the condition of the body, i.e., the 
retention of a brain.202  Finally, the legislative body is in the best 
position to implement a notification requirement because it can 
accumulate pertinent information that would address policy and 
practical concerns.203 
V. CONCLUSION 
At first blush, protecting the feelings of a person seems insig-
nificant.  However, a closer look at the purpose of protecting those 
feelings makes it clear that the common law right of sepulcher is 
momentous.  The right of sepulcher is an old common law rule that 
protects the next of kin’s right to the immediate possession of the de-
cedent’s body for proper burial.  New York courts have grasped the 
importance of protecting the right of sepulcher and the legislature has 
codified the rule within NYPHL article 42.  However, although New 
York courts had previously broadly interpreted the common law right 
of sepulcher and NYPHL article 42 for the purpose of upholding the 
next of kin’s right, it began to narrowly interpret the law resulting in 
a deterioration of the common law right of sepulcher.  New York 
courts must be sensitive to the importance of the right of sepulcher, 
and fully understand the effect a narrow interpretation has on 
survivors.  A notification requirement can alleviate much of the 
heartache.  The New York legislative body should enact statutes to 




201 See Rugova, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 238 (failing to notify the plaintiff resulted in an interfer-
ence with the right to interment). 
202 Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 77 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
203 See Macrelli v. Children’s Hosp., 888 N.E.2d 940, 943, 945 (Mass. 2008) (holding that 
the M.E.’s retention of the organ did not violate statute); see also Dorchester Reporter, 
http://www.dotnews.com/2014/making-david-s-law-story-love-grief-resolve (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2015) (holding in Marcrelli resulted in legislature passing David’s law). 
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